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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 35 and the request of the Clerk, 
Hercules, Inc. submits this Reply to Plaintiff's Response to 
Defendant's Petition for Rehearing. 
ARGUMENT 
The relevant statute in effect when Wagner initiated 
this action in 1986 did not authorize an award of attorneys' fees 
to the prevailing party. In 1989, during the pendency of this 
case, the statute was amended to include a provision for awarding 
attorneys' fees. To apply the amendment retroactively against 
Hercules would be unfair and inconsistent with policies articu-
lated by the courts of Utah and of neighboring jurisdictions. 
The amendment is substantive in nature because it creates new 
rights and liabilities and it changes the measure of damages. 
Substantive changes in statutes which occur during the pendency 
of an action are not given retroactive effect. 
Furthermore, there is no reason to award attorneys' 
fees to Wagner in this action. Hercules defended at trial in 
good faith and made no counterclaims. There is no evidence or 
allegation that Hercules engaged in frivolous, vexatious or 
oppressive conduct. 
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I. THE ATTORNEYS1 FEES PROVISION IS A SUBSTANTIVE AMEND-
MENT AND SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY. 
In Utah, "[attorney's fees are chargeable to an oppos-
ing party only if there is a contractual or statutory liability 
therefor." Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168, 171 (Utah 1977).X 
Contractual liability for attorneys' fees is not at issue in this 
action; the only issue is whether there is statutory liability. 
Wagner initiated this action on January 16f 1986, when 
the relevant statute did not authorize an award of attorneys' 
fees. Utah Code Ann. S 14-2-3 (1953 as enacted 1963). During 
the pendency of this case, S 14-2-3 was repealed in 1987, and 
then in 1989, S 14-2-2 was amended to include a provision for 
awarding attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. Utah Code Ann. 
S 14-2-2(3) (as amended 1989). The issue which this Court has 
raised through its opinion and rehearing order is whether the 
amended statute should be given retroactive effect to permit an 
award of attorneys' fees. Utah law, as well as persuasive 
authority from other jurisdictions, counsels that S 14-2-2(3) 
should not be applied retroactively. 
Although S 14-2-2 is silent regarding its application 
to pending actions, its effective date is April 24, 1989. The 
standing rule of statutory construction, as codified, is that 
1
 In Utah, courts have equitable power to award attorneys' 
fees to the prevailing party if the court determines that the 
action or defense was without merit and not asserted in good 
faith. Utah Code Ann. S 78-27-56 (1990); Cadv v. Johnson, 671 
P.2d 149 (Utah 1983). Hercules' conduct in this case would not 
warrant assessing Wagner's attorneys' fees against Hercules. 
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w[n]o part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless 
expressly so declared." Jtd. S 68-3-3 (1990) (emphasis added). 
Retroactive application of statutory enactments is dis-
favored because it is unfair to the parties. "The general rule 
is that the law establishing substantive rights and liabilities 
when a cause of action arises, and not a subsequently enacted 
statute, governs the resolution of the dispute." Carlucci v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 725 P.2d 1335, 1336 (Utah 1986). Fairness 
implies that litigants should be able to order their conduct 
according to the law in effect at the time litigation decisions 
are made, especially when the controlling law is statutory. For 
this reason, Utah courts have recognized that "ordinarily the 
facts and the law in a given lawsuit are to be applied as of the 
date of the filing of the original complaint." Archer v. Utah 
State Land Bd.. 15 Utah 2d 321, 324, 392 P.23 622, 624 (1964). 
The courts have recognized certain exceptions to the 
rule against applying a statute retroactively. The exception to 
the rule of nonretroactivity most significant in this dispute is 
that intervening amendments which are remedial or procedural 
only, and which do not enlarge, eliminate or destroy vested or 
contractual rights, may be applied retroactively to pending 
actions. Pilcher v. Department of Social Servs., 663 P.2d 450, 
455 (Utah 1983). It appears that no Utah court has ever 
addressed the issue of whether an amendment authorizing an award 
of attorneys' fees fits within the remedial/procedural exception. 
In the absence of Utah case law directly on point, 
there are two sources to guide the Court in determining whether 
-3-
an amendment authorizing an award of attorneys1 fees is remedial 
or procedural. Both recommend against applying S 14-2-2(3) ret-
roactively. The first source is Utah cases addressing whether 
other kinds of amendments (not involving attorneys' fees) are 
remedial or procedural. The second is cases from other jurisdic-
tions directly addressing the issue of whether statutory amend-
ments authorizing attorneys' fees are substantive or procedural. 
In Carlucci. supra, the court addressed the issue of 
whether the statute creating the Default Indemnity Fund was sub-
stantive or merely remedial and procedural. The Fund was created 
to pay workers or their dependents compensation benefits when 
their employers are unable to pay. The plaintiff argued that the 
statute creating the Fund was remedial and that it therefore 
could be applied retroactively to cover the death of her husband, 
who had died five months before the statute's effective date. 
The Utah Supreme Court ruled that the statute was substantive and 
therefore could not be applied retroactively. The court deter-
mined that the statute was substantive because it created new 
rights and liabilities. Carlucci, 725 P.2d at 1337. 
The attorneys' fees provision in S 14-2-2 is like the 
statute in Carlucci in that it also creates new rights (for pre-
vailing parties) and new liabilities (for losing parties). This 
similarity between the statutes indicates that the amendment 
authorizing attorneys' fees is substantive in nature, and should 
not be applied retroactively. 
In Pilcher v. Dept. of Social Servs., supra, the issue 
was whether a statute enacted in 1975, authorizing the State to 
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recover past due child support payments, could be applied retro-
actively to the payments owed under a 1965 divorce decree. The 
Utah Supreme Court stated that although retroactive application 
of statutes is disfavored, "an exception is made for remedial 
procedural statutes." Pilcher. 663 P.2d at 455. The court con-
cluded that the statutory provisions at issue were remedial and 
procedural because they provided a means for enforcing existing 
child support payments, creating no new obligations, and destroy-
ing no vested interests. 663 P.2d at 455-56. 
By contrast, requiring Hercules to pay Wagner's attor-
neys1 fees pursuant to S 14-2-2(3) would impose a new obligation 
which did not exist before the amendment. Thus, S 14-2-2(3) does 
not possess the characteristics of a remedial or procedural 
amendment, and should not be applied retroactively. 
The second source of guidance for determining whether 
an amendment authorizing an award of attorneys' fees is remedial 
or procedural is the body of case law from neighboring jurisdic-
tions addressing the issue. The jurisdictions are split over 
this issue, but the majority of Utah's neighboring states which 
have addressed the issue have held that amendments authorizing 
attorneys' fees are substantive, and thus courts refuse to apply 
them retroactively. However, it is the reasoning of the cases, 
not the number of them, which is most persuasive. 
The Arizona courts have addressed the issue of whether 
statutes authorizing attorneys' fees are substantive in the con-
text of deciding whether retroactive application is appropriate. 
Wagner cites Circle K Corp. v. Rosenthal. 118 Ariz. 63, 574 P.2d 
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856 (Ct. App. 1977), but Hercules believes that a more informa-
tive case is Bouldin v. Turek, 125 Ariz, 77, 607 P.2d 954 (1979), 
decided by the Arizona Supreme Court one year after the Arizona 
Court of Appeals' decision in Circle K. 
In Bouldin, the issue was whether a statute providing 
for an award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in a con-
tract dispute applies retroactively to suits commenced before the 
effective date of the statute. Like Utah, Arizona recognizes the 
exception for remedial or procedural statutes. 607 P.2d at 955. 
The court specifically examined the attorneys' fees provision and 
held that "such a provision is substantive and not procedural." 
Id. Most importantly, the court explained why a statute awarding 
attorneys' fees is substantive: because it changes the measure 
of damages. Id.; see also, Sallomi v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 
160 Ariz. 144, 771 P.2d 469 (App. Ct. 1989) (statute awarding 
attorneys' fees is not procedural and may not be applied retroac-
tively to pending libel cases); USLife Title Co. v. Soule Steel 
Co., 122 Ariz. 79, 593 P.2d 302 (Ct. App. 1979) (statute granting 
discretion to award attorneys' fees in contract actions is sub-
stantive and may not be applied retroactively). 
The Oregon courts have also addressed the issue of 
retroactivity of a statute awarding attorneys' fees. In 
Zaik/Miller v. Hedrick, 72 Or.App. 20, 695 P.2d 88 (1985), a 
statute awarding attorneys' fees took effect while the trial 
court proceeding was pending. Plaintiffs argued that the statute 
was remedial or procedural rather than substantive but the court 
held that the attorneys' fees provisions were substantive, and 
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refused to apply the statute retroactively. The court explained 
that because attorneys' fees "are not merely costs incidental to 
judicial administration, awarding them is a matter of substan-
tive, rather than procedural, right." Zaik/Millerf 695 P.2d at 
89 (quoting Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Schriber, 51 Or.App. 441, 
448, 625 P.2d 1370, 1373 (1981)). See also, Bahr v., Ettinqer, 
88 Or.App. 419, 745 P.2d 807 (1987) (statute authorizing attor-
neys' fees against party who acted in bad faith is substantive 
and may not be applied retroactively). 
Courts in Colorado and Nevada have also held that stat-
utes authorizing attorneys' fees may not be applied retroactively 
to actions pending on the statute's effective date. See 
Allchurch v. Project Unicorn, Ltd., 516 P.2d 441 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1973)(statute authorizing recovery of attorneys' fees in unearned 
wage claim may not be applied retroactively); American Fed, of 
Musicians v. Reno's Riverside Hotel, Inc., 475 P.2d 220 (Nev. 
1970)(striking an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to statute 
amended after the commencement of the law suit). 
Furthermore, the present action can be distinguished 
from the cases cited by Wagner. In Jensen v. Shank, 99 Idaho 
565, 585 P.2d 1276 (1978), the statute allowing attorneys' fees 
was in effect before the cause of action was tried. In Eriksen 
v. Blue Cross of Idaho, 116 Idaho 693, 778 P.2d 815 (Ct. App. 
1989), the statute allowing attorneys' fees was in effect before 
the lawsuit was even filed. However, the situation in the 
present case is significantly different from Jensen and Ericksen 
in that S 14-2-2(3) became effective after the law suit was 
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tried. Applying S 14-2-2(3) retroactively would work a greater 
unfairness to Hercules because, compared to Jensen and Erjjcsen, 
the amendment in this action became effective at a significantly 
o 
later stage of the litigation. 
The present action can also be distinguished from Camer 
v. Seattle School Dist. No, 1, 52 Wash.App. 531, 762 P.2d 356 
(1988). In Camer, the court awarded attorneys' fees because it 
found the plaintiff's claims to be frivolous. 762 P.2d at 361. 
By contrast, there is no evidence or allegation that Hercules 
made frivolous defenses. 
In sum, S 14-2-2(3) is substantive because it changes 
the measure of damages, it creates new rights and liabilities, 
and the attorneys' fees are not incidental to judicial adminis-
tration. The amendment should, therefore, not be applied 
retroactively. 
In addition to the remedial/procedural exception, the 
courts have recognized certain other exceptions to the rule of 
nonretroactivity. One such exception exception exists for pri-
vate attorney general statutes. Wagner cites cases upholding the 
retroactivity of private attorney general statutes, such as the 
Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act, as though these cases 
add support to the claim that the remedial/procedural exception 
should apply. See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Petition 
for Rehearing at 10-11. These cases do not support Wagner's 
2
 In the trial court proceedings, where Hercules was the pre-
vailing party, Wagner correctly argued that S 14-2-2 could not be 
applied retroactively to this action. The trial court appropri-
ately ruled that the amendment does not apply retroactively. 
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argument because the objective of the private attorney general 
doctrine is to encourage public policy suits which benefit a 
broad class of citizens. Woodland Hills v. City Council of Los 
Angeles, 154 Cal. Rptr. 503, 593 P.2d 200, 208 (1979). By con-
trast, S 14-2-2(3) is a section in a chapter of the code entitled 
"Private Contracts," and deals solely with private contracts 
between owners and contractors. 
There is also an exception to the general rule for 
amendments intended to clarify or amplify existing law. See, 
e.g.. Deot. of Social Servs. v. Higgs. 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982). 
However, S 14-2-2(3) does not fit within that exception because, 
rather than merely clarifying or amplifying an existing statute, 
the amendment adds an entirely new dimension to it. 
Thus, S 14-2-2(3) does not fit within any recognized 
exception to the general rule against retroactivity, and should 
not be retroactively applied in this action. 
COHCLUSION 
In Utah, the general rule is that the law creating sub-
stantive rights and liabilities when a cause of action arises, 
rather than a subsequent amendment thereto, governs the resolu-
tion of the dispute. An amendment authorizing an award of attor-
neys' fees changes the measure of damages, thereby altering the 
rights and liabilities of the parties, and thus is a substantive 
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change. Substantive amendments are not given retroactive effect 
to pending litigation because to do so would be unfair. More-
over, awarding attorneys' fees in this action would not be appro-
priate because Hercules' defense was made in good faith, and was 
neither frivolous nor oppressive. 
For the reasons stated herein, Hercules requests the 
Court to deny Wagner's request for attorneys' fees. 
DATED this day of November, 1990. 
z£G 
JAMES M. ELEGANTE 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant Hercules 
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